Priorities and targets: supporting target-setting in healthcare by Nuti, Sabina et al.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rpmm20
Download by: [Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna] Date: 03 April 2017, At: 01:49
Public Money & Management
ISSN: 0954-0962 (Print) 1467-9302 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rpmm20
Priorities and targets: supporting target-setting in
healthcare
Sabina Nuti, Milena Vainieri & Federico Vola
To cite this article: Sabina Nuti, Milena Vainieri & Federico Vola (2017) Priorities and targets:
supporting target-setting in healthcare, Public Money & Management, 37:4, 277-284, DOI:
10.1080/09540962.2017.1295728
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09540962.2017.1295728
© 2017 The author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group
Published online: 31 Mar 2017.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 5
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
PUBLIC MONEY & MANAGEMENT MAY 2017
277
© 2017 The author(s)
Governance based on planning and control
systems with performance indicators (PIs) and
targets is a form of indirect control that is
widely deemed necessary to administer any
complex system (Beer, 1966; Pollitt, 1986;
Carter et al., 1992; Bird et al., 2005). However,
managing by objectives requires tackling at
least two difficult issues:
•Defining the appropriate number of
indicators.
•Choosing a rigorous principle to define which
indicators should be considered as high
priorities.
Regarding the first point, the process of
governance by PIs and targets relies on a set of
measures representing social complex
phenomena. This translation process—from
social phenomena to quantitative measures—
requires careful design. Only some of these
phenomena can be represented by quantitative
figures, because indicators portray the
‘measurable’ part of the observed object.
The process of governance by PIs and
targets relies on the assumption that available
indicators are both representative and accurate.
The so-called ‘synecdoche’ principle assumes
that the measurable part will satisfy both these
conditions, by accurately representing the
whole object (Carter et al., 1992). However,
measurement systems almost never comply
with the synecdoche principle, because the set
of selected indicators is rarely able to portray
the complexity of the evaluated processes
(Bevan and Hood, 2006) and may cause
distortions and stimulate undesired behaviours
on the part of the agents who are controlled by
the system.
Studies on the distorting effects of control
systems are extensive (Birnberg et al., 1983;
Briers and Hirst, 1990; Le Grand and Bartlett,
1993). The basic point is that, in order to make
the planning and control scheme meaningful,
the measures used should be consistent with
the performance targets (which should, in
turn, be representations of organizational
objectives) so that the behavioural responses
of the agents are matched to the requirements
of the principal (Smith, 1995). The selection of
the indicators and the consequent target-setting
phase are therefore crucial, since they can
potentially generate incoherent behaviours in
the system and lead the organizations towards
undesired goals (Ferreira and Otley, 2009;
Locke and Latham, 2013).
Since the 1950s, scholars have been
studying the dysfunctional consequences of
measurement; many of them have looked at
‘output distortions’, i.e. attempts to achieve
single targets at the cost of significant but
unmeasured aspects of performance ( Ridgway,
1956; Nove, 1958; Miller, 1993; Kornai, 1994;
Smith, 1995; Heinrich, 2002; Hood, 2002;
Propper and Wilson, 2003; Bird et al., 2005;
Bevan and Hood, 2006).
In 1991, Bouckaert and Balk described ‘13
diseases’ of public productivity measurement,
which resulted from wrong assumptions and
problems concerning the content, position and
amount of measures (Bouckaert and Balk,
1991). Similarly, Smith wrote about eight
potential and unintended behavioural
consequences of performance data use (Smith,
1995). These problems are all the result
ignoring the synecdoche principle, which
causes an inconsistency between agents’ goals
and the actual goals wanted by the principal:
‘tunnel vision’, ‘suboptimization’, ‘myopia’,
‘measure fixation’, ‘misrepresentation’,
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‘misinterpretation’, ‘gaming’, and ‘ossification’
(Hopwood, 1973; Smith, 1993, 1995; NHS
Executive, 1999, 2000; Goddard et al., 2000;
2002). Tunnel vision is when management
emphasizes quantifiable phenomena in a
performance measurement scheme, at the
expense of unquantifiable or unmeasured
aspects of the performance.
Since the 2000s, many scholars have been
investigating the reasons behind failures of
results-based management, with a particular
focus on the public sector (Hofstede, 1981;
Eden and Hyndman, 1999; Van Thiel and
Leeuw, 2002).
Managing by objectives requires tackling
two issues: first, defining the appropriate
number of indicators that work as objectives;
second, choosing a correct principle to define
which indicators should be considered as high
priorities. Regarding the second point, some
recent studies have found that public managers
prioritize competing performance goals
according to political control mechanisms
(Rutherford and Meier, 2015). This means
that the determinants of managerial priorities
are not always to improve performance or
produce better value for money, but are the
result of bureaucratic control/hierarchical
pressure.
The result of all these limitations is the so-
called ‘performance paradox’, which is a weak
correlation between PIs and performance
(Meyer and O’Shaughnessy, 1993; Meyer and
Gupta, 1994). Certain characteristics of public
sector organizations can increase the chance of
a performance paradox occurring (Le Grand,
1991; Torenvlied, 2000; Fountain, 2003).
Performance measurement systems in the
public sector can degenerate into formal
ceremonies that have little impact on
behaviours and do not contribute to improve
the efficiency, effectiveness and accountability
of an organization (Sharifi and Bovaird, 1995).
In countries that have adopted universal
healthcare coverage financed by general
taxation (Morton and Cornwell, 2009), profit
is not significant while the concept of ‘value for
money’ is very important. Performance
evaluation systems in these cases need to
include a wide range of indicators (Taylor and
Taylor, 2015). Process, efficiency and
productivity indicators should be included in
the performance evaluation systems (Murray
and Frenk, 2000; Arah et al., 2003; 2006). A
key issue is the choice of the appropriate
number of indicators to use—too many targets
and indicators might disorient and generate
confusion and then priority actions can be
ignored (Van der Stede, 2009). On the other
hand, the fewer the number of PIs, the more
difficult it is to obtain an accurate performance
overview (Meyer and Gupta, 1994). Indicators
also need to change over time (Van Thiel and
Leeuw, 2002, p. 276).
Van Thiel and Leeuw (2002) point out the
need to find a balance between an expansion
of the number of performance measures on
the one hand, and a reduction of the measure
pressure on the other. The target-setting phase
should, therefore, include a number of targets
large enough to limit the synecdoche and
‘output distortion’ problems and, at the same
time, sufficiently small to keep the controlled
actors focused on the priority issues.
Goddard proposed selecting some
‘headline’ indicators—focused on priority
issues that are published and used to hold
organizations to account. Other indicators
would be used for internal benchmarking
purposes only (Goddard et al., 2002). Smith
suggests developing a dynamic performance
evaluation system that would adapt the choice
of the ‘right’ indicators to the situation (Scriven,
1973; Smith, 1993, p. 141).
The methodology we describe in this paper
reflects both proposals, by combining the
completeness of a wide performance evaluation
system (PES) with a rigorous and iterative
selection of a few headline indicators. The
algorithm we describe sets regional priorities
and selects a subset of indicators for the target-
setting phase that will reflect the complexity of
the healthcare systems without creating
confusion with too many indicators.
We developed our PES to support Italian
regional policy-makers in the target-setting
phase and it is being used by the Italian regions.
Our system provides regions with about 200
indicators (see, for details, Nuti et al., 2015).
The Laboratorio MeS developed the
performance evaluation framework as an
independent research unit and co-ordinates
and manages information-sharing and data
acquisition. The 14 regions in the network
have agreed on the criteria to calculate the
indicators. Each region is responsible for
processing its own data in order to increase the
awareness and expertise of regional managers
and their staff. The PES measures the results
with a multidimensional approach in
quantitative terms and then assesses the
performance of 100 indicators out of 200:
excellent, good, sufficient, poor, or very poor.
These five evaluation tiers are associated with
different colours, from dark green (excellent
performance), to red (poor performance).
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Regions use the same reference standards for
their evaluation, based on academic literature,
national standards or, when these are lacking,
on the median of the 150 health authorities
(HAs).
At the start of the project, the regions
agreed that they wanted increased
transparency for public accountability. An
annual performance report is published and
the web platform where the data are stored is
public (performance.sssup.it/netval). The
report includes all measures for the regions
and their HAs.
Method
Regional priorities are identified by jointly
evaluating three different issues that should
be relevant to them: performance; capacity for
improvement; and reduction of geographical
disparities. Geographical differences are
important in terms of equal access: when
variations that cannot be explained by
population needs are found, there clearly is a
problem with fairness (Wennberg et al., 2003;
Barsanti and Nuti, 2014; Nuti and Vainieri,
2014).
For each indicator in the PES, the method
evaluates:
•Regional performance, measured by
benchmarking against the other regions.
•Trend, measured in comparison with the
other regions’ trends.
•Internal variability, i.e. the measurement of
the differences between local health
authorities (LHAs) in the region.
The algorithm first selects, from a total of
200 indicators, the indicators whose
performance, trend and variability are
universally available. It then excludes the
indicators that regions consider to be
‘observational’ (indicators with questionable
accuracy or that are not relevant by themselves
but are important to be able to understand the
dynamics of other indicators). This process
assures that the remaining indicators are
sufficiently relevant and accurate.
Second, the procedure excludes the
indicators that depict the epidemiological status
of the regions (for example infant mortality or
suicides): these indicators portray the
healthcare need of each region. Each LHA and
every regional healthcare system aims at their
improvement; however, these are measured
with a two-year delay and the phenomena they
monitor cannot be modified in the short term
by the regional healthcare governance on its
own.
Once these exclusions are made, about 85
indicators (with small fluctuations among
regions) are left: these indicators provide the
quantitative basis for detecting regional
priorities. In order to do this, the regional
performance of each indicator, its trend and
its geographical (intra-regional) variability are
computed as follows.
 First, each indicator is evaluated against
the performance of the other regions or—
when available—against a national or an
international standard. Each region is therefore
assigned a discrete score for each indicator,
ranging from ‘1’ (‘poor performance’) to ‘5’
(‘excellent performance’). The score is assigned
to a colour: red for ‘1’, orange for ‘2’, then
yellow (score equal to ‘3’), green (‘4’) and dark
green (‘5’). The same colours are associated
with the trend and the variability score,
described below. Colour-coding is very effective
because it immediately depicts how the
indicators are performing.
 Second, the algorithm identifies regional
priorities by considering the annual trend that
each indicator shows. The annual trend of
each indicator is computed for each region
and compared to the trend of all the other
regions. More precisely, the difference between
each regional indicator trend and the median
regional trend is computed; this difference is
then divided by the inter-regional standard
deviation of the trends, according to the
following formula:
tr - tr
median/stdev (tr)
The resulting coefficient measures how far
each regional indicator’s trend deviates from
the network median. Each indicator is therefore
assigned a second score for each region (the
‘trend score’), ranging again from ‘1’ (‘strong
worsening’) to ‘5’ (‘strong improvement’). This
score reflects each regional trend compared to
the trends of the other regions: see table 1. An
example is the changes in the percentage of
femur fractures operated on within two days
of being admitted to hospital from 2012 to
Table 1. Trend score.
Trend Coefficient Score Colour
Strong improvement >1 5 Dark green
Improving trend From 0.5 to 1 4 Green
Average trend From -0.5 to 0.5 3 Yellow
Worsening trend From -1 to -0.5 2 Orange
Strong worsening < -1 1 Red
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2013 in the different regions in the network
(see figure 1). The percentage increased by
nearly 26% in the autonomous province of
Trento, while it did not change very much in
Tuscany; therefore, considering the median
and the standard deviation, the autonomous
province of Trento is given a score equal to ‘5’
and Tuscany equal to ‘2’.
Geographical performance variability
among LHAs (within each region) is the third
criterion the algorithm uses to identify regional
criticalities. The inter-LHAs coefficients of
variation are computed for each region and
each indicator. The quintile distribution is
subsequently calculated for each region.
Equally, the coefficients of variation are not
included for those indicators that refer to only
one LHA in the region. A ‘variability score’
that ranges from 1 to 5 is attributed to each
indicator, according to the quintile occupied
by the indicator (see table 2).
As an example, the coefficients of variation
of Tuscany can be computed for 88 indicators
in 2013. A variability score, based on quintile,
assigns 5 to the first quintile, 4 to the second
and so on: see figure 2.
Finally, three different scores are available
for each indicator and for each region:
performance, trend and variability scores, each
of them ranging from 1 to 5. It is therefore
possible to sort the indicators for each region:
first based on the performance score, second
on the trend score, and finally, on the variability
score.
Next, we added a fourth column to give
policy-makers information about the
financial impact each indicator might have
in the short and medium term. The fourth
column had a simple X next to the indicators
where an improvement would result in
financial savings within a year. The fourth
element was added to the methodology to
provide information on the relevance each
indicator has in terms of resource re-
allocation strategies (Nuti et al., 2010). See
table 3 for an example.
Use of the methodology
Table 3 provides a way of detecting regional
problems, by jointly considering the
performance of each region (benchmarked
against the other regions), the trend of each
indicator and intra-regional variability. Each
region should start its analysis by examining
the first column—benchmarked
performance. In table 3, a region should
Figure 1. Femur fractures operated on within two days after hospital admission: 2012–2013
trend.
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Table 2. Variability score.
Variability Variation coefficient (quintile occupied) Score Colour
Very low I 5 Dark green
Low II 4 Green
Average III 3 Yellow
High IV 2 Orange
Very high V 1 Red
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first take into consideration indicators
C11a.3.1 and C18.6, which show a very poor
performance, and subsequently move to
indicators with a poor performance. An
indicator requires a lot of attention if low
performances are associated with worsening
trends. The inclusion of the ‘variability score’
provides policy-makers with the information
they need to design strategies that are tailored
to single issues. If the third column warns of
a strong intra-regional variability, each LHA
should be assigned a specific target, based
on the LHA’s previous performance. Under-
performing LHAs should be required to show
more improvement. However, if internal
variability is low, the problem applies to the
region as a whole and a structural answer
should be designed, involving all of the actors
of the healthcare system with uniform targets
for providers.
Our technique has triggered discussions
between regional managers on the priorities
to be considered when setting HAs’ targets.
In some cases, the tool has been used to link
financial rewards, while in others it has been
used to define the HA managers’ ‘mandated
goals’, i.e. the results that chief executives
are expected to meet in a three-year period.
Table 3. Example of the final output for region α.
Code Region Indicator Performance Trend Variability Short-term
score score score savings
C11a.3.1 Region α Hospitalization rate for COPD per
100,000 residents (aged 50–74 years) 1 3 2
C18.6 Region α Hospitalization rate for varicose vein
stripping per 100,000 residents 1 3 2
D9 Region α Percentage of people leaving the emergency
department without being treated 2 1 1
C16.2 Region α Percentage of green code patients
visited within 1 hour 2 2 2
C4.7 Region α Surgical ELC DRGs: percentage of hospital
admissions in day surgery (Healthcare
Agreement 2010) 2 2 2
F10 Region α Pharmaceutical expenditure 2 2 4 X
C1.1 Region α Standardized hospitalization rate
per 1,000 residents 2 2 5
C14.2 Region α Percentage of medical outpatient admissions
for diagnostic purposes (Healthcare
Agreement 2010) 2 3 1
C18.1 Region α Hospitalization rate for tonsillectomies 2 3 1 X
C8a.19.2 Region α Paediatric hospitalization rate for
gastroenteritis per 100,000 residents
aged ≤  17 years 2 3 1
Figure 2. Marche: coefficients of variation in 2013.
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The tool for setting priorities relies on
information from the network’s performance
evaluation system and it does not consider
regional peculiarities. Therefore, it is up to
regional policy-makers to decide how to
weigh the three aspects (performance, trend
and variability) in the priority-setting process
and how to integrate the regional governance
mechanisms with the evidence provided by
the evaluation system.
Discussion and conclusions
This paper provides policy-makers and
managers with a new method for selecting
targets. The method overcomes some of the
adverse effects found in large performance
measurement systems. Regarding the
synecdoche effect, our selection of indicators
(85 were chosen out of 200) assured accuracy
and relevance (accuracy and relevance are
preconditions of the synecdoche principle).
Second, we understood that neither the
adoption of a limited set of indicators, nor
the use of a wide range of measures
automatically leads to distortion-free results
(Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). However,
our algorithm helps policy-makers select an
appropriate number of indicators, without
neglecting any important aspects of
healthcare and—at the same time—without
confusing anyone about priorities.
Our procedure systematically analyses
all the available indicators, including all the
indicators monitored by the PES in the
criticalities detection process. However, the
selection of the problematic indicators gives
policy-makers the opportunity to set up an
incentive system on a limited number of
indicators, which keeps the controlled actors
focused on the priorities. The mechanism
we describe helps administrators set targets
on ‘a part’ of the indicators, selected because
of their relevance to the ‘whole’ system.
Therefore, it solves the problem of using an
excessive number of indicators.
 Regarding output distortions, the
iterative nature of our procedure—the
selection of the priorities is repeated each
year—limits opportunistic behaviours.
Professionals cannot neglect the indicators
that are not incentivized (‘suboptimization’).
It detects worsening indicators (or their
increase in variability) and these are
automatically selected as priorities in the
following year.
Bevan and Hood suggest a solution for
limiting opportunistic behaviours by
introducing some uncertainty in target
specification. Their thesis is that excessive
predictability could undermine the control
itself, by facilitating opportunistic reactions
(Bevan and Hood, 2004). The methodology
we describe reverses their hypothesis:
opportunistic behaviours are limited not by
the inclusion of a degree of uncertainty but
by the certainty that they will be detected the
following year, when the algorithm includes
all the indicators and not only the incentivized
ones. The algorithm is designed to monitor
a large number of indicators—and to account
for the different viewpoints and goals
stakeholders might have—but at the same
time, it focuses the attention of the managers
and the policy-makers on the indicators that
are more critical in terms of performance,
trends and variability.
To prevent the performance paradox,
Meyer and Gupta (1994) recommend that
organizations adopt a ‘paradoxical model of
performance assessment’ with multiple,
uncorrelated, varying, but comparable, PIs.
The method we describe does exactly that.
This method is particularly appropriate for
use at a regional (or macro) level. In
transferring this approach to a micro-level (for
instance hospitals or health authorities) internal
differences must be taken into account.
However, if the micro-level is responsible for a
large territory or a large number of providers,
as in the Italian regions, this approach could
be used at the micro-level. In this case, further
analyses are needed to better understand the
typology of indicators to be included, the
effectiveness of the use of this approach at
micro-level and its results.
The method presented in this paper was
developed as a governance tool for regional
healthcare systems. It is the first step to
follow in setting targets: identifying priorities.
Other techniques can be useful to help
managers define what is challenging and
how to conduct a fair evaluation to motivate
employees (see Vainieri et al., 2016). We
believe that a similar approach could be
applied also in other parts of the public
sector that are managed by strong
professional bureaucracies (Mintzberg, 1983;
Mintzberg et al., 2003), and have information
asymmetry and high complexity. We think
that the method would be particularly useful
in the education sector (Micheli and
Kennerley, 2005; Bevan and Fasolo, 2013;
Bevan and Wilson, 2013; Taylor and Taylor,
2015). Further research is needed to evaluate
how our methodology should be fine-tuned
to be used in other sectors.
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IMPACT
A new algorithm is presented that is currently used by Italian regional healthcare directorates
in order to: identify poorly-performing areas; identify an appropriate number of PIs to
represent those areas; design coherent improvement strategies; and then to link the chosen
strategy to regional planning and control mechanisms. The algorithm has the potential to
be used in smaller setting (health authorities) and at a the national level.
